WikiLeaks: A Complex Issue with Simple Underlying Principles
Other than reposting links on Facebook and the odd comment to friends, I haven't tried to consolidate my thinking on the "WikiLeaks" situation. It's a complex situation, but the general shape of the issues we should be aware of, as citizens of the U.S. and the European democracies, are becoming clear.
First, I do think it's important to start with a caveat. Whatever we individually believe about WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, "CableGate," and the reaction of governments and corporations, we can't simply dismiss the fact that the content being posted *matters*. I do believe that there are reasons to keep some information restricted. The world would not be a better place if, for example, someone decided to post exact and detailed instructions online for designing the "hard bits" of easily concealable, tactical nuclear weapons. I'm sure we can all think of similar examples of information that (a) once it's known, (b) needs to "not be free." Another way to say this is to make the distinction between the **right** to freedom of speech, and the **right to disclose** specific pieces of information. We can, and should, recognize that the former is an inalienable right in modern democracies, while recognizing that there are valid reasons to restrict the latter. This means, of course, that I've set up an inherent tension between our fundamental rights, and other interests.
With respect to WikiLeaks, the entire global conversation seems to revolve around (a) what other interests might be involved, (b) what responses are appropriate, and (c) for what actions we can hold different classes of individuals responsible. Let's take these in turn.
With respect to the second issue, there are definitely going to be disclosures which cause damage to human sources. No amount of redacting will protect virtually everyone named in some of these cables. I'm not saying that every single source is in danger of losing their lives or being tortured, as would be more likely with document dumps from other "three letter acronym" agencies, but of course there's a chance of that. Mostly there's going to be people who can be traced back regardless of redaction who will no longer be trusted, who will lose jobs, who will spend hours being "interviewed" by security services, etc. The problem, from the public's perspective, is that we have no way to know about this, or to judge the true extent of such problems. It is in the interests of the State Department and U.S. government to exaggerate this problem no matter what the true level is, in order to enforce security. So as citizens, we simply need to understand that the problem exists, and make sure that we pressure folks like Julian Assange and the WikiLeaks team to provide better and better protection for named individuals. Redaction isn't enough -- "pattern analysis" is going to identify many folks simply because only they could have been in certain places, with access to certain data. Folks who want to follow WikiLeaks and provide similar disclosure/whistleblowing services need to think long and hard about this. The FBI has a witness protection program for organized crime informants for a reason, and that reason applies quite directly to this situation.
The third issue is really a lot more straightforward, from my perspective. Corporations have intimate relationships with governments today, for a variety of purposes, not all of which they prefer to be generally known. The recent story about DynCorp, a defense contractor operating in Afghanistan, essentially "pimping out" young boys to Pushtun men is a case in point. This is precisely the kind of thing that companies, their lobbyists, and pliable government officials regularly sweep under the rug and cry "foul" when it's disclosed. But they cry foul and try to sweep it under the rug precisely because they **know** that it's wrong, and that the vast majority of people in the U.S. and globally will disapprove, and would "throw the bastards in jail" if they could. But leave aside truly criminal, immoral activity for a moment. Focus instead on things like the BP oil spill. Since corporate action resulted in damage to others, and to the public domain, and necessitated a public response, it's hard to see an argument that precise information about the event shouldn't be available to the general public. To my mind, there is frequently not a valid rationale for shutting down something like WikiLeaks simply because they disclose information about private companies and their activities. They cross the line only when disclosing confidential information for which there is no compelling public interest; an example would be disclosure of trade secrets or pre-release designs. That's just commercial espionage, it's not a public service.Appropriateness of Response
A lot of the controversy surrounding WikiLeaks really has to do with the response of governments and corporations. Unlike previous leaks by Assange and crew, CableGate has triggered a massive and seemingly coordinated global response. Assange was hunted down, possibly on trumped-up charges, and is now in jail and I don't think anybody really expects him to get an impartial, fair trial anywhere on the planet. U.S. lawmakers have been heard calling for the death penalty, a Canadian official called for assassination, as if Assange had put himself well beyond the boundaries of national and international law. In a word, governments around the world moved promptly to classify Assange and his group as terrorists, whether they fit any classical definition of the term or not.
Corporations around the world have moved quickly, while claiming they were under no official coercion, to act as unofficial arms of the government and draw the circle tighter around WikiLeaks and Assange. In general, this has been the most disgusting and shocking part of the entire incident. Every single action here has been a violation of the most basic tenets of the rights guaranteed by the modern developed democracies. Forget for a moment whether Amazon had a legal right to kick out a client without notice or cause. Their action in isolation might be perfectly within their rights, but as part of the overall pattern it's undeniable that governments and corporations simply acted as if WikiLeaks and Assange had been tried and found guilty of specific criminal acts, or had actively declared war. When, in fact, nothing of the sort had occurred. Did the individual who stole the information from State Department computer networks commit a crime? Absolutely. The individual being held is, of course, innocent until proven guilty, but the computer forensic evidence appears to be quite strong. If he's tried and convicted, he will deserve the sentence handed down. He broke the law, and quite a serious one.
Did Julian Assange and WikiLeaks break the law? That's a much tougher question, and one that clearly involves a number of loopholes. It's illegal to participate in the dissemination of classified information. But does U.S. law apply to WikiLeaks? Does U.S. law apply if they have servers in other countries and mirror sites in the U.S.? If their content is cached by CDN networks in the U.S.? These are only the beginning of the complexities involved in determining whether WikiLeaks is actually legally liable for posting the content.
Yet governments and corporations universally decided, without delving into these questions at all, that the answer had to be "WikiLeaks is a rogue organization, breaking the law, and thus we can go after them."
That's unamerican. And un-English, un-French, un-Swiss, etc etc. And we should all be deeply ashamed of ourselves for letting our governments get away with it.
Again, that's unamerican. And we should be deeply ashamed of ourselves for letting this happen.